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DOE V. COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY:
A SET-BACK FOR THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing
to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classi-
fied as an illness; we consider it to be a variation of the sexual
function produced by a certain arrest of sexual development.
Many highly respected individuals of ancient and modern
times have been homosexuals, several of the greatest men
among them (Plato, Michelangelo, Leonardo de Vinci, etc.).
It is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime,
and cruelty too.'
Sigmund Freud in a
letter to an American
mother.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the American attitude towards sexuality has
been diagnosed as erotophobic, or as having "exaggerated anxi-
eties and fears of sexual behavior of all types with inordinate
attempts to place such activities under societal regulations.
' 2
This phobia has its historical basis in the Judeo-Christian ethic
of Western Europe, an influence transmitted here and
strengthened by the early Puritan Movement. 3 Its manifesta-
tions are the current body of state laws which proscribe "crimes
against nature," or "unnatural" or "abnormal" sexual rela-
tions.4 While most sodomy statutes apply equally to both heter-
osexuals and homosexuals,5 it is usually only the latter who
suffer arrest and conviction for the activities included in such
1 107 AM. J. PSYCH. 786, 786-87 (1951).
2 M. WEINBERG & C. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: THEIR PROBLEMS AND
ADAPrATIONS 31 (1974).
3 Id. at 32; W. CHURCHILL, HOMoSEXuAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 199-229 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as CHURCHILL].
' H.F. Pilpel, Sex vs. the Law, in STUDIES IN HUMAN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 65 (A.
Shiloh ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Pilpel].
Such "abnormal sexual relations" may include anal intercourse, fellatio, cunnilin-
gus, mutual masturbation, sex with animals or fowl, or sex with the dead, depending
on the statute and case law of the jurisdiction.
' CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at 225; Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Private
Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974).
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statutes.6 An individual convicted of performing a homosexual
act faces the possibility of a jail sentence from a few months
to twenty years depending on the jurisdiction. 7 Other jurisdic-
tions label a homosexual a "sexual psychopath" and require
him to undergo involuntary hospitalization until he is
"cured."" Even after the individual has paid his debt to society,
the stigma attached to the crime and conviction act as further
punishment resulting in family disgrace, social ostracism, and
subsequent difficulty in finding and keeping employment.9
' CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at 225; Comment, California's "Consenting Adults"
Law: The Sex Act in Perspective, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 439 (1976).
7 Special Student Contribution, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17
N.Y.L.F. 273, 278 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Overview].
5 WEINBERG & WmLAms, supra note 2, at 33.
The enforcement of "sexual psycopath" legislation against homosexuals has been
criticized. First, what constitutes a "sexual psychopath?"
The term "sexual psychopath" should be strictly limited to those individuals
who practice violence, fraud, exploitation, or coercion in connection with
sexual gratification. It should not be applied to individuals who may merely
be described as neurotic, eccentric, immoral, or unconventional in their sex-
ual behavior, or to individuals who confine their sexual activities to acts
practiced in private with the consent of the partner.
CHURcHILL, supra note 3, at 223.
Furthermore, the object of this legislation is to treat and not punish the "sexual
psychopath." However, there is still no "cure" for homosexuality. See Fisher, The Sex
Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland Criminal Code: Should Private
Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded?, 30 MD. L. Rv. 91, 112 (1970).
As a result, an "uncured" homosexual could be held for treatment indefinitely. "Such
an individual would be better off if he were sentenced under ordinary criminal statutes
since there would at least be some limitation to the term of his sentence." CHURCHmL
supra note 3, at 224.
9 A. KAIEN, SExuA~u~Y AND HoMosExuALmY 609-11 (1971); WEsT, HoMosExUALrry
102-03 (1967); Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REV. 687, 691.
92 (1973).
Once convicted or once their condition becomes known to the relevant au-
thorities, male sex deviants (like the leprous or the insane) must expect some
legal and social restrictions. If they work in certain fields, such as teaching,
or governmental posts involving security risk, they will lose their jobs. If they
belong to a profession with strict disciplinary rules, like solicitors and medi-
cal men, they may have their license to practice taken away. They will not
be accepted for admission to the armed forces or the merchant navy, they
will be found unsuitable for a wide range of employments such as police,
prison service, youth workers and so forth. They will never be considered for
important posts in politics or public life. They may even encounter difficul-
ties if they want to enter as students at a university. They will be rejected if
they apply to immigrate to another country.
WET at 91.
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Currently, thirty-four states make private homosexual
behavior between consenting adults subject to criminal sanc-
tion."° The validity of such laws has recently come under scru-
tiny.1 It is argued that whether an individual chooses to engage
in such conduct is a question of that person's own moral judg-
ment, not for the state's determination.'2 This argument does
not seem radical in a country that arguably recognizes a consti-
tutional right of privacy, 3 loosely defined as the "right to be
let alone."' 4 However, in the recent case of Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney,'5 the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed that the Virginia sodomy statute had a rational basis
of state interest demonstrably legitimate so that homosexual
relations carried on privately between consenting adult males
could be prosecuted.'6 The Court stated that the right to pri-
vacy concerned only issues relating to marrige, home, or family
life." This decision may lend credence to the continued exist-
" ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 106 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.120 (Supp. 1975),
amending ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.120 (1970); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-651 (West Supp.
1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (Harrison Supp.
1972); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Supp. 1976), reenacting IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1948);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1974); Ky. REV.STAT. § 510.100 (1975); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27 §§ 553-554 (1976); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.158, .338-.338a (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West Supp. 1976); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.230 (Vernon Supp. 1953); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-505 (MONT. CRIM. CODE Smith 1975); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-
919 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632.2 (Supp.
1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 143-1 (West 1968); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney
Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12 (1976);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1958); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124 (Purdon
Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-10-1 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-412 (1962);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1975); Tx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2603 (Equity 1974)
(see also State v. La Forrest, 45 A. 225 (Vt. 1899); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie
Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West 1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-98 (Michie
Supp. 1975), amending Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-98 (Michie Supp. 1957).
" See text accompanying notes 36-42 infra.
12 REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE ON HoMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTrrUTyON 25 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as WOLFENDEN REPORT]; Hefner, The Legal Enforcement of
Morality, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 199 (1968); Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-A
Right to be Different?, 38 ALB. L. REv. 84, 95-96 (1973); Comment, supra note 9, at
699.
13 See text accompanying notes 42-60 infra.
"1 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946).
" 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901, rehearing denied,
425 U.S. 985 (1976).
" Id. at 1203.
, Id. at 1200-02. See text accompanying notes 65-99 infra.
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ence of these statutes 8 as well as limit the right of personal
privacy.
III. CRITICISM OF THE LAWS
Laws prohibiting private adult consensual homosexual
intimacy have been subjected to a growing amount of criticism.
The efficacy of such legislation is questionable, since there is
doubt as to whether such laws can ever eliminate" or "cure"
20
homosexuality in society. Furthermore, many of the major pol-
icy reasons that form the doctrinal basis of the criminal process
are not served by these laws. The state does have an interest
in removing dangerous people from society, but homosexuals
and homosexuality do not constitute such a danger per se.2' It
is also doubtful whether these laws serve to deter such private
homosexual behavior.2 2 Whether such laws and their enforce-
ment work to rehabilitate and reform a person's basic sexual
"1 The Supreme Court's decision is contrary to an emerging trend in several juris-
dictions to decriminalize private sexual behavior between consenting adults. See
Fisher, supra note 8, at 111-12.
" CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at 237; F. S. CAPPmO, VARlTIONS IN SExuAL BEHAvioR
294 (1955).
"0 There is still a controversy over whether homosexuality is a form of mental
illness. Recently, the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from
their list of mental disorders. It is now considered a "sexual orientation disturbance"
only for those homosexuals whose "sexual interests are directed toward people of their
own sex who are in conflict with or wish to change their sexual orientation." N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 1973, § 1 at 1, col. 1; id., April 9, 1974, at 12, col. 4. Even if one assumes
that homosexuality is a form of mental illness, "you don't successfully treat a neurosis
by passing a law against its manifestations." Hefner, supra note 12, at 216. See also
Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to be Different?, 38 ALB. L. Ray. 84,
103 (1973); Fisher, supra note 8, at 112; Overview, supra note 7, at 289.
21 "Private adult homosexual conduct causes little or no harm to the community
aside from the anxiety that homosexuals create among heterosexual citizens." Fisher,
supra note 8, at 97. Homosexuals do not pose a threat to person or property. Further-
more, to point to instances of homosexual assault and conclude that homosexuality is
dangerous per se would be similar to concluding that heterosexuality is dangerous per
se by looking to the occurrence of heterosexual rape. Comment, supra note 9 at 691;
Overview, supra note 7, at 289.
Sodomy statutes do not effectively deter homosexual behavior because they are
seldom enforced and are easily evaded by those who engage in such behavior in private.
Furthermore, in several countries that have either legalized homosexual activity or
simply not enforced the laws against it, there has been no indication of any increase
in homosexuality. See WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 12, at 24; Fisher, supra note 8,
at 96-97; Overview, supra note 7, at 289-90; cf. Fisher, supra note 8, at 98-99, Com-
ment, supra note 9, at 691.
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orientation is also questionable.23
Many reasons used by the states to justify their laws
against homosexual behavior have been found to lack proper
justification. Private consensual adult homosexual acts pose no
threat to the societal institutions of marrige24 and the family,2
or to the state interest in maintaining an "effective citizenry. "26
State legislation prohibiting private adult consensual homo-
sexual activities is not justified by a state interest in protecting
the young from child molesters since homosexuals are not
pedophiliacs. 21 Neither are state interests in preventing
"promiscuity" and the spread of venereal disease served by
these laws. 28 Finally, there is no evidence that the legalization
of such activity would result in an increase of homosexuality 9
or would lead to the endangerment of the propagation of the
human race, or result in the decline of civilization."
2 Imprisoning an individual convicted for committing a homosexual act in a
sexually segregated prison only acts to aggravate and strengthen the homosexual tend-
ency. See Pilpel, supra note 4, at.66-67; Overview, supra note 7, at 290.
2, Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its
Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J. 623, 629 (1961).
' WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 12, at 22; CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at 233-34;
KARLEN, supra note 9, at 616; cf. SCHUR, CmIMs WrrTOUT Vicrms 110-11 (1965): "It is
quite true that control over homosexuality serves to strengthen the position of the
family and to re-enforce sex role differentiation. But this fact hardly provides a basis
for wholesale legal and social persecution of inverts."
26 Thus, while there may be certain functions, such as military service
or jobs involving classified information for which homosexuals are presump-
tively unfit [due to possible disgrace or threat of blackmail], homosexuality
apparently does not unsuit an individual for all or even most societal func-
tions. Therefore, a ban on all homosexual activity will not significantly fur-
ther the state interest in maintaining an effective citizenry.
Note, supra note 5, at 1634.
7 WOLFENDEN REPORT supra note 12, at 23; Food, Homosexuals and the Law: Why
the Status Quo?, 5 CAL. WEST L. REv. 232, 245-46 (1969); Note, supra note 24, at 628-
29.
2 Comment, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults-Why Not? 2 PAC. L.J. 206,
223 (1971).
State sodomy laws may even contribute to sexual promiscuity and the spread of
venereal disease. "The prohibitions on homosexual conduct outlaw homosexual mar-
riage, discourage stable relationships, and encourage furtive affairs. The prohibitions
also contribute to the higher incidence of venereal disease among homosexual people
by discouraging them from seeking treatment or diagnosis. . . . [I]nfected homosex-
uals are reluctant to incriminate themselves or their partners." Note, supra note 5, at
1632-33.
2' WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 12, at 24; Fisher, supra note 8, at 100.
' CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at 233-34; SCHUR, supra note 25, at 110-11.
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State laws proscribing private adult consensual homosex-
ual acts are also criticized in that they are largely unenforced
and unenforceable,' as the crime for the act of "sexual miscon-
duct takes place privately, or at least stealthily, leaving behind
no damage and no complaining victim."32 The negative reper-
cussions of having such unenforceable laws on the books are
fivefold: First, the fact that they are largely unenforced tends
to breed disrespect for the law;33 second, when such laws are
periodically enforced a situation is created whereby the police
use "unsavory vice squad techniques" such as entrapment,
raids on homosexul gathering places, stake-outs in public facil-
ities and harassment; 4 third, these laws cause an unnecessary
drain on limited police resources and morale, and even contrib-
ute to police corruption;3 5 fourth, the potential for prosecution
of these laws leaves homosexuals open to extortion, blackmail,
and other forms of illegal exploitation;" and fifth, these prohi-
11 Fisher, supra note 8, at 111. SCHUR, supra note 25, at 79; Ploscowe,
Homosexuality and Crimes Against Nature, in HoMosExuAurrY-A CROSS CULTURAL
APPROACH 401 (D.W. Cory ed. 1956). There have been several estimates made compar-
ing the number of convictions for "crimes against nature" and the probable number
of such acts. The estimates run from one conviction for every 2,500 acts to one for every
6,000,000 acts. KARLEN, supra note 9, at 613. There is some question as to whether
society would want such laws enforced. "If anything even remotely resembling full and
just enforcement of these laws were ever attempted, our prisons and houses of correc-
tion would be filled to overflowing before the first twenty per cent of the offenders had
been apprehended." CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at 238. Kinsey estimated that if these
laws were enforced, 95% of the white American male population would be convicted
for violating these laws at least once. A. KnlsaY, W. PoMoY, & C. MARTn, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE, 390-93 (1948).
32 WEsT, supra note 9, at 84.
CAPRio, supra note 19, at 297; Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638,648 (Alas. 1969)(dic-
tum).
3' CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at 226, 228; KARLEN, supra note 9, at 610; ScHuR, supra
note 25, at 79, 81, 114. "It was virtually impossible to arrest an individual for private
sexual activity without exceeding search and seizure limitations." Comment, supra
note 6, at 445.
Is There have been instances when members of the law enforcement and legal
communities have used the enforcement of sodomy statutes for their own corrupt ends.
"Some magistrates and police have been known to yield to bribery, or even to encour-
age it, in the handling of these [sodomy] cases. The arrest and trial of homosexual
citizens have become little more than a racket for the enrichment of unscrupulous
police officers, bailbondsmen, lawyers, and magistrates." CHURCHILL, supra note 3, at
226. It has been said that such laws create a "climate of corruption." Overview, supra
note 7, at 293 n.80. See SCHUR, supra note 25, at 114; WNBERG and W ,IAis, upra
note 2, at 394; Comment, supra note 2, at 394; Comment, supra note 9, at 692.
31 KAiLEN, supra note 9, at 611; PloscowE, supra note 31, at 404; SCHUR, supra
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bitions indirectly sanction the existing discrimination against
homosexuals in the field of employment, housing, and public
accomodation.Y1
Criticism of these laws has come from legal and medical
circles. 8 Recently, there has been a movement in these cricles
urging the decriminalization of private adult consensual homo-
sexual acts. In 1957, the English Government's Committee on
Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution issued the famed
"Wolfenden Report" which recommended that English law be
changed so that homosexual behavior between consenting
adults in private no longer be a criminal offense, a recommen-
dation later ratified by the Parliament .3  Both the American
Psychiatric Association0 and the National Institute of Mental
Health4' have called for liberalization of the state sodomy stat-
utes. As early as 1955, the American Law Institute excluded
from its Model Penal Code section on "Deviate Sexual Inter-
course" all sexual practices not involving force, adult corrup-
tion of minors, or public offense."4 The 1970 Report of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
suggested that "homosexuality and other deviate sexual activ-
ity among consenting adults not be illegal.
43
note 25, at 114; WEST, supra note 9, at 102-03; Note, supra note 5; Comment, supra
note 9, at 691.
37 "Gay activitists groups contend that the Constitution notwithstanding, known
homosexuals meet discriminatory resistance when they try to rent apartments, book
hotel rooms, and apply for jobs." N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1973, § 4 at 5, col. 1.
3 KARLEN, supra note 9, at 612.
" WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 12, at 25. Although the report was submitted
in 1957, the Parliament did not pass a bill calling for legalization of consensual adult
homosexuality until 1967. Although it took ten years to enact the bill, reports showed
that in 1967 almost two-thirds of the public were in favor of it, as compared to the
previous thirty-eight percent in favor of reform in 1957. KARLEN, supra note 9, at 613.
4* N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1973, § 1 at 1, col. 1; id., § 1 at 25, col. 1.
41 NATIONAL INsTrrUTE OF MErAL HEALTH, FiNAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS
OF THE UNITED STATES TASK FORCE ON HOMOsEXUALITY 6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
NIMH REPORT].
42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); revised, § 213.2 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).
41 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAws §§ 1643-1644 (1971). However, the proposed criminal code sections have not yet
been enacted.
[Vol. 65
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III. THE PRIVACY ARGUMENT
It has been said that an individual's right to privacy is the
strongest argument for securing "constitutional protection for
the private exercise of consensual adult homosexual activity.""
Basically, the privacy argument in this context is that private
consensual adult homosexual acts are included under the right
of privacy as recognized by Griswold v. Connecticut45 and ex-
tended by the cases of Eisenstadt v. Baird," Roe v. Wade,4 and
Stanley v. Georgia."5 With homosexual behavior protected by
the constitutional right to privacy, the state must then prove
a "compelling interest" to justify an interference with this
right. Assuming that the state has no compelling interest, such
state prohibitions would be struck down as unconstitutional.49
In Griswold, the Supreme Court first declared that the
Constitution guarantees a right of privacy. 0 The Griswold
Court struck down a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of
contraceptives on the ground that the statute was overbroad
because it interfered with the marital relationship. In particu-
lar, the Court did not approve the idea of police searching "the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
14 Note, supra note 5, at 1637. State statutes prohibiting "crimes against nature"
have been challenged as unconstitutional on other grounds. See generally Note, supra
note 5, at 1613 for a discussion of the due process and equal protection arguments, and
Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) on the question of vagueness.
Is 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
" Several commentators have used this analysis. See Overview, supra note 7, at
295-97; Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to be Different?, 38 ALB. L.
REV. 84, 92-96 (1973); Comment, supra note 9, at 687, 694-98; Comment, supra note
28, at 221-23.
381 U.S. at 479, 481-86.
The right of personal privacy is not explicit in the Constitution or in the Bill of
Rights. There has been some difficulty in finding the exact origins of the right of
privacy since the justices in Griswold differed as to its constitutional foundations.
Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, based the right to privacy on the
penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. Id. at 482-85.
Justice Goldberg, concurring, put more emphasis on the ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Id. at 487-93. Justice Harlan, concurring, disagreed with the reasoning of his
brethren and stated that the right of privacy was so "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" that it was protected from state infringement by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 499-500.
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of contraceptives.""1 The privacy concept established in
Griswold was later extended by the Court to include relations
outside marriage in Eisenstadt v. Baird.12 In this case, the Su-
preme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that forbade
the distribution of .contraceptives to single individuals on the
grounds that it violated the right of privacy and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 The majority
opinion suggested that the Griswold right of marital privacy
was actually an individual right of privacy, stating:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own;
but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child."
In Roe v. Wade,55 the right of privacy was extended to protect
a woman's decision to have an abortion. The Supreme Court
held that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was a deeply
personal matter of fundamental importance in the life of the
decision maker.57 Furthermore, the Court looked to the possible
adverse medical and psychological effects that the anti-
abortion statute inflicted, and found as a result that the law
"may force upon a woman a distressful life and future."8
1, Id. at 485.
52 405 U.S. 43 (1972). The right of privacy as enunciated in Griswold was limited
to the marriage relationship, and Eisenstadt's expansion of that right beyond the
marriage relationship to private individuals was thought by some commentators to
safeguard private homosexual behavior. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 638, 639-40 (1974);
Note, supra note 5, at 1619; Comment, Consensual Homosexual Behavior-The Need
for Legislative Reform, 57 Ky. L.J. 591, 595 (1969); Hughes v. State, 287 A.2d 299, 305
(Md. 1972).
5 405 U.S. at 446-55.
' 405 U.S. at 453; see also Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to
be Different?, 38 ALB. L. REV. 84, 96 (1973).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Id. at 153. The Court limited this right to the first trimester of the pregnancy.
Id. at 163-64.
'T Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 152.
[Vol. 65
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The right of privacy as enunciated in Griswold and ex-
tended in Eisenstadt and Roe can be used to protect private
adult consensual homosexual acts from criminal prosecution.
Both Eisenstadt and Roe speak in terms of an individual right
or privacy dealing with the important decision of whether to
"bear and beget a child."59 An individual's decision to engage
in homosexual behavior is just as important and deserving of
personal privacy. One's sexual orientation is a personal matter,
having a profound effect on one's life. "It influences his or her
choice of friends, social activities and family relations, and
bears on the decisions to marry and to procreate.""0 As such, it
is a decision for the individual, not the state. Furthermore, as
in Roe, state prohibitions in this area have adverse affects upon
homosexuals outside of the criminal sanction. "The existence
of legal penalties relating to homosexual acts means that the
mental health problems of homsexuals are exacerbated by the
need for concealment and the emotional stresses arising from
this need and from the opprobrium of being in violation of the
law."
61
In addition, the ability of an individual to participate in
private adult homosexual acts may be protected by the right
of privacy of the home, as interpreted in Stanley v. Georgia.2
In that case, the Supreme Court decided that although the
state has a justifiable interest in the regulation of obscenity,
the state could regulate obscenity only as long as it did not
interfere with an individual's possession and use of porno-
graphic films in the home. Such an interference would be an
unconstitutional invasion of a person's privacy in his home. 3
Using this line of reasoning, it could be argued that a state has
insufficient justification for interference with consensual adult
homosexual activities carried on in the privacy of an individ-
ual's home. 4
, 405 U.S. at 453; 410 U.S. at 154.
" Note, supra note 5, at 1620; Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp.
1199, 1204 (E.D. Va. 1975)(dissenting opinion); cf. Comment, supra note 9, at 696.
11 NIMH REPOiT, supra note 41, at 6; SCHUR, supra note 25, at 97-102; WEST, supra
note 9, at 102; Note, supra note 5, at 1620.
62 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
- 394 U.S. 557, 565-68 (1969).
" See State v. Elliot, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975), in which the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held that N.M. STAT. AN. § 40A-9-6 (prohibiting oral and anal sex
1977]
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IV. DOE V. COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY
The constitutional right of privacy has been used to chal-
lenge the constitutional validity of state laws prohibiting sex-
ual acts of consenting adults involving both marrieds and un-
marrieds, heterosexuals and homosexuals alike. These chal-
lenges have met with mixed results." While some courts have
held that this right of privacy could not be interfered with by
such laws,66 other courts have not extended privacy rights be-
yond the marital context 7 or have decided that the acts in-
volved were not private6 or consensual." However, whether
state laws could constitutionally prohibit private adult consen-
sual homosexual activity was never so squarely addressed as in
the case of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.
70
In Doe, two adult male homosexuals7' brought a class ac-
as well as bestiality) was unconstitutional in that it invaded the right of privacy of the
marital relationship, the privacy protecting the sexual relations of unmarrieds, and
privacy of the home. Id. at 212-14. The New Mexico Supreme Court later reversed the
lower court and upheld the constitutionality of the law in State v. Elliot, 551 P.2d 1352
(N.M. 1976), citing as the basis for its decision Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). See text accompanying notes 72-112 infra.
See also Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975), in which the Alaskan Supreme
Court held that the state could not enforce its criminal laws against the possession of
marijuana for the private, non-commercial use of marijuana in the home, since it
would violate the right of privacy of the home. Id. at 500-16. Ravin, like Stanley v.
Georgia, is another example of the right of privacy limiting the scope of the criminal
prosecution.
Note, supra note 5, at 1621.
' Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D.C. Md. 1973) (dictum); In
re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (dictum); Rittenour v. District
of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558, 559 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359-
60 (Iowa 1976); State v. J.O., 355 A.2d 195, 196-97 (N.J. 1976); State v. Elliot, 539 P.2d
207, 212-14 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976) (see note 64 supra).
" Dixon v. State, 268 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind. 1971); Hughes v. State, 287 A.2d 299,
305 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (dictum); Pruet v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Texas
Crim. App. 1971); see Annot., 58 A.L.R.3D 636, 639-40 (1974).
A Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (admittance of third person for
a menage-a-trois violated the concept of marital privacy); Smayda v. United States,
353 F.2d 251, 257 (9th Cir. 1965) (the right of privacy does not encompass homoAexual
act in public toilet); Raphael v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (simu-
lated acts of sodomy performed in public).
11 Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581, 582-83 (W.D. Va. 1969) (petitioner forced
act of sodomy on wife); State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6 (Ariz. 1976) (right of privacy not
applicable because one party did not consent).
70 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
The two homosexuals, using the pseudonyms of John Doe and Larry Roe, were
aided by the A.C.L.U., the National Gay Task Force, and the Lambda Legal Defense
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tion suit before a three judge district court 72 asking that a Vir-
ginia statute prohibiting "crimes against nature ' 73 be declared
unconstitutional. Each plaintiff claimed that his constitutional
right of privacy was violated by the statute as "applied to his
active and regular homosexual relations with another adult
male, consensually and in private."7 The plaintiffs also sought
to enjoin the Commonwealth Attorney for the city of Rich-
mond, Virginia, from enforcing the statute. The court held that
the case was not a valid class action suit7" and upheld the
statute as constitutionally valid.
In upholding the Virginia statute, the majority of the court
narrowly construed the right of privacy as granted in Griswold
to pertain only to the marital relationship. The court reasoned
that "homosexual intimacy" was not protected by the privacy
right since it "is obviously no portion of marriage, home, or
family life. 7 7 The opinion contained quotations from Mr. Jus-
tice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold7 and Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman79 to show that
while privacy protects the marital relationship, homosexual
and Education Fund. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1976, at 1, col. 8; id., May 20, 1976, at
31, col. 2.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1948).
VA. CODE 18.1-212 (1950):
Crimes against nature. If any person shall carnally know in any matter any
brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by
or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the penitentiary not less
than one year nor more than three years.
(Current version at VA. Con § 18.2-361 (1975)).
1, 403 F. Supp. at 1200. Plaintiffs relied on the first and ninth amendments for
their privacy argument. See note 50 supra. Plaintiffs also claimed that the statute
violated their fifth and fourteenth amendments' assurance of due process, their first
amendment's protection of their rights of freedom of expression, and their eighth
amendment's forbiddance of cruel and unusual punishments. However, this Comment
will cover only the privacy argument since the district court addressed only this argu-
ment.
75 Id. at 1200 n.1 and at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
1, Id. at 1203.
7 Id. at 1202.
11 Id. at 1201; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965).
11 403 F. Supp. at 1201, 1202; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546, 552-53 (1961). In
Poe, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal contesting the constitutionality of the
same Connecticut anticontraceptive law that it later struck down in Griswold on the
ground that the case was non-justiciable.
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activity is still "denunciable by the state.""0 Furthermore, the
court found that the state interests served by the statute, those
of promoting "morality and decency"'" and of preventing
"moral delinquency," formed a "rational basis of state interest
demonstrably legitimate and mirrored in the cited decisional
law of the Supreme Court."" Finally, the court used the corro-
borative evidence of the prevalence of similar statutes in other
states and the longevity of the Virginia statute as further testi-
mony as to the legitimacy of the law.83
District Judge Merhige in dissent stated that the majority
had over-adhered to the facts of Griswold in interpreting the
right of privacy. 4 He argued that any marital/non-marital dis-
tinction was destroyed in Eisenstadt v. Baird.5 The Eisenstadt
decision coupled with the reasoning in Roe v. Wade" led to the
conclusion that:
[T]he right of privacy in sexual relationships is not limited
to the marital relationship . . . .[I]ntimate personal deci-
sions or private matters of substantial importance to the well
being of the individuals involved are protected by the Due
Process Clause. The right to select consenting adult sexual
partners must be considered within this category. The exer-
cise of that right, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
should not be proscribed by state regulation absent compel-
ling justification.87
Thus, the dissent placed the burden to prove a compelling
justification on the defendants and then stated that they had
made no effort to establish either a rational basis or a compel-
ling state interest so as to justify the proscription of the stat-
ute. 8 Judge Merhige also stated that even with an arguable
state interest in promoting "morality and decency," the plain-
tiffs would still be protected from state intrusion by the consti-
tutional right of privacy of the home as enunciated in Stanley
403 F. Supp. at 1201.
, Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1202-03.
' Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1204; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
410 U.S. 113 (1972).
403 F. Supp. at 1204.
Id. at 1205.
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v. Georgia.9
After the district court's adverse decision petitioners exer-
cised their right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court." The
Supreme Court did not grant plenary consideration to the
case91 and, without benefit of oral argument and written opin-
ion, summarily affirmed the district court's holding.92 By the
simple use of the phrase "we affirm," the Supreme Court held
that it is constitutionally permissible for a state to proscribe
private homosexual activity between consenting adults.93
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe is trou-
blesome because it provides no explanation of the Court's rea-
soning about a matter of concern to many individuals. There
is no doubt that Doe has precedential value for the state and
lower federal courts, 94 but what is the precedent it establishes?
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
district court, the majority opinion of the latter court does not
provide a binding ratio decidendi since a mere summary af-
firmance "does not indicate adoption of the opinion below."95
As a result, lower courts will have difficulty applying this pre-
cedent to future cases. 6 Not only will lower courts have prob-
lems in discerning why the Supreme Court decided as it did,
Id.; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Only three Justices, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, voted to grant plenary
consideration to the case. This was one vote short of the "rule of four" that determines
whether such consideration will be granted to a case. 425 U.S. 901 (1976); see R. STERN
& E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.16 (4th ed. 1969); Note, Summary
Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals, 52 B.U.L. Rav. 373, 396-402 (1972).
12 425 U.S. at 901.
' The Supreme Court dismissed a later petition to rehear the case, 425 U.S. 985
(1976).
4 STERN & GRESsUAN, supra note 91, at § 5.16; Coons, Clune & Sugarman,
Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial
Structures, 57 CAL. L. Ray. 305, 309 n.9 (1969); Note, supra note 91, at 377, 410; Note,
Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARv. L. REv. 707, 713 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Per Curiam Practice]; contra, Note, supra note 9, at 377.
,1 Per Curiam Practice, supra note 94, at 715. However,
[1]ower federal courts have also relied on such affirmances, but as with some
state courts, there is a considerable tendency to look to the summary affirm-
ance only after principally relying on the opinion of the lower court which
was affirmed, and to utilize the citation to the per curiam only as a citation
to the history of the case.
Id. at 714.
" Note, supra note 91, at 377, 407, 411-12; Per Curiam Practice, supra note 94, at
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they may also have difficulty determining the scope of that
affirmance.17 Perhaps the Supreme Court did agree with the
reasoning used in the district court's majority opinion that Vir-
ginia had a legitimate state interest in branding homosexuality
as criminal. Or Doe could be an extension of Wainright v.
Stone,"8 a 1973 case in which the Supreme Court held that a
Florida sodomy statute was not unconstitutionally vague. The
Court could be refusing to extend the right of privacy beyond
the "personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage,
motherhood, procreation and child rearing." 9 It could have
decided for all, none, or some of these reasons and it will be
impossible to tell until the Court gives the reasoning for the
decision.
VI. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF Doe
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance met with a
mixed reaction. Conservative newspaper editorials said that
the Court exercised proper judicial restraint in Doe,", while
more liberal editors stated that the Court should have decided
differently on the matter.'" ' Both civil liberties and "gay
rights" groups were shocked by the holding.0 2 The criticisms
made went not only to the substance of the Supreme Court's
affirmance but went also to the Court's use of the summary
affirmance device.'
°3
It is too early to tell what the long term effects of Doe v.
" "[Tihere is considerable agreement that summary disposition often leaves
uncertain what has been decided, even where the court cites controlling authority"
(emphasis added). Note, supra note 91, at 411.
" 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1972).
11 Kilpatrick, Judicial Restraint on Sex Laws, Times Picayune, April 22, 1976, at
12, col. 2; Wall St. J., April 5, 1976, at 12, col. 1.
M L.A. Times, April 1, 1976, § 2, at 6, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 31, 1976, at 40,
col. 1.
212 TIME, April 12, 1976, at 50; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 31,
98.
203 Doe was
retrogressive enough, but it was made worse by the way in which the Court
chose to reach that conclusion. Without hearing oral argument, without
writing an opinion, the Court summarily affirmed the judges of a lower
federal court-which was of course its legal right to do so, but not its social
obligation.
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Commonwealth's Attorney will be. It has been said that the
decision constitutes a departure from the trend toward expand-
ing the constitutional right of privacy.04 In fact, Doe might
even be a retrogression in regard to the right of privacy.115 In
Lovisi v. Slayton,"' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Supreme Court's decision in Doe "necessarily confined
the constitutionally protected right to privacy to heterosexual
conduct, probably even that only within the marital relation-
ship. "I"7 A similar interpretation of Doe was made in State v.
Elliot. "08 This interpretation ignores the extension of privacy in
the marital context found in Griswold to the non-marital situa-
tion found in Eisenstadt v. Baird. If this is the case, then state
"sex crime" laws can also be applied to private heterosexual
activity engaged in by unmarried consenting adults.
The decision constitutes a setback to a valid movement
which seeks the decriminalization of private adult consensual
homosexual behavior."9 Those attempting to have such laws
overruled in the courts now have to overcome the awesome
weight of an adverse Supreme Court precedent. As a result, gay
activists and their sympathizers will have to move their battle
against state sodomy laws from the courts to the state legisla-
tures,"'° but even there, Doe may act to delay or defeat the
legalization of homosexuality.
Tim O'Neill
L.A. Times, April 1, 1976, § 2, at 6, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 30, 1976, at 1,
col. 8.
I" N.Y. Times, March 31, 1976, at 40, col. 1; see TH NEw REPUBLIC, May 15, 1976,
at 15; id., May 29, 1976, at 13.
'" 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), afi'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
'' 539 F.2d at 352 (emphasis added).
539 P.2d 207 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976) (see note
66 supra).
" CHRiSTIANiTy TODAY, April 23, 1976, at 36; L.A. Times, March 30, 1976, § 1, at
8, col. 1.
1" L.A. Times, March 30, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 3; § 1, at 8, col. 1
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